Effectively managing IT 
Introduction and overview
Effectively managing service centers such as call centers, computerized diagnostic imaging facilities, data centers, e-commerce sites, SaaS, and telecommunication networks has always been a challenging task. Owners of the centers (firms) are responsible for capacity investment, which is often capital intensive and involves significant upfront fix costs. While high utilization is desirable to stay profitable, firms also have to maintain an acceptable service level in order to compete. Managers of these centers, on the other hand, are usually responsible for managing daily activities and generating demand through marketing. For example, at most free-standing radiology facilities such as those run by Insight Imaging, the local managers are responsible for marketing and demand generation. Because managers often run the service centers as a profit center, demand generation is a critical job function that they perform. What makes the issue complicated is that managers, as the agents running the service centers, often possess private information about market condition and their marketing efforts. Thus, firms (principals) would like to induce true market information from the managers when making capacity investment. This, however, is not an easy task because managers often have diverged interests. In this paper, we apply the principal-agent framework to address the service center capacity management and mechanism design issues.
Prior researches [3, 4, and 10] have modeled IT service centers as queueing systems and mostly focused on capacity allocation within a firm through an internal pricing scheme. In these works, demand is exogenous and there is no agency issue. Clearly, this model setting does not apply to many IT service centers that we mentioned above. Harris et al. [5] study effective resource allocation under incomplete information. This is one of the early works on mechanism design. In their model, agents have private information on their productivities and effort levels. The objective of the firm is to minimize the costs of producing a given level of output by designing an efficient mechanism which outlines how to allocate a common resource produced by one agent to other agents to product the final products. However, since the output level is given there is no demand uncertainty in their model. Hasija et al. [6] study call-center outsourcing contracts. In their model, the call-center vendor has private information on its staff's efficiency (i.e., service rate) and decides a staffing level which affects the call-center service quality. The client offers outsourcing contracts which specify financial and service quality terms. They evaluate different contract forms with the aim of finding contracts that coordinate the service supply chain, i.e., contracts that induce the vendor to choose the optimal staffing level which maximizes the total supply-chain profit. Here, the vendor makes staffing decision which affects the callcenter's service quality, but it has no influence on market demand. This paper is also related to [2] since both study a problem which combines moral hazard with adverse selection. In Chen's [2] paper, the agent (a sales agent with negative exponential utility function) has private information on market condition and exerts selling effort which is not observable by the principal. The principal makes inventory stocking decision and designs a compensation scheme (linear contract) to induce the agent to truthfully reveal market condition so that it can better match supply with demand. The focus of [2] , however, is to derive the corresponding Gomik's scheme and compare it with a menu of linear contracts. We instead focus on service center incentive contract design in this paper. Similarly, the agent has private information on market demand and can increase demand by investing in marketing effort. The principal makes capacity investment and designs a menu of contracts. But here, because of demand uncertainty and the stochastic arrival and service processes, customers often experience delays at the service center, and customer delays cannot be resolved by overstocking inventory but by investment in capacity or staffing. If the principal invests too much in capacity, while the delay costs are under control capacity costs go up. If the principal under-invests in capacity then delay costs explode. Thus, the principal would like to induce market information from the agent in order to determine the optimal capacity level. We derive two incentive contracts, both of which can induce true market information from the manager. And one even induces the first-best effort level from the agent.
Our study also extends Basu et al. [1] , who focus on the compensation contract design of a sales force selling a commodity good with an unlimited supply. In contrast, we and [8] model the capacity management and contract design issue of a service organization with a finite capacity. And we extend [8] by allowing the agent to possess private information regarding market demand and including mechanism design in the model. Our study provides guidelines for firms that deal with congestion-prone systems and sheds light on how to effectively manage service facilities with combined moral hazard and adverse selection issues.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first present the model setting in section 2 and then analyze the case with full information in section 3. In section 4, we derive two contracts for the information asymmetric case where the agent's effort is not observable and the agent has private information regarding market condition. We show that both contracts can induce true market information from the agent. We compare the results under the two contracts with the full-information case in section 5 and conclude the paper in section 6.
The model
Consider a service center such as a data center or an application service provider with a random demand. There is one principal-the owner of the center and one agent-the manager of the center. The owner is responsible for capacity investment and the manager is responsible for managing the center and marketing its service. We model the service center as an M/M/1 queueing system, where the arrivals of service requests are independent and follow a Poisson process with a rate of λ requests per unit time, and the service time has an exponential distribution with service rate μ.
Let r be the revenue from processing a service request. We assume that the marginal cost of processing a request is constant, and it is normalized to zero. Because of demand uncertainty and the stochastic arrivals of service requests as well as random service time, the service center often experience queueing delays. Let W be the expected time in the system for a service request. That is W includes waiting time in queue and service time. In order to compete in the market, the service center has to meet a service standard: W ≤ W 0 , which means that the center promises to its clients that a service request's expected time in the system is no longer than W 0 . We can think of W 0 as an industry-wide service standard. Let c be the per unit capacity cost, assuming linear capacity cost function. The owner needs to make corresponding capacity investment to ensure that the center will meet the service standard.
Let θ be the expected base demand, which is the exogenous expected service demand without the manager's marketing effort. Different from [3, 4, and 10] , here service demand can be influenced by the manager's marketing effort α , where
, i.e., when the manager invests in marketing effort α , the expected demand increases by ) (α φ . We assume that
. In addition, the expected base demand θ is a random variable, which could be θ h and θ l (θ h > θ l ) with probability q and 1 -q, respectively. This setting better captures the characteristics of many modern IT service centers and it creates two management challenges for the owner.
First, while the owner only knows the distribution of the expected base demand θ, the manager running the center often has better knowledge about the realized market condition θ. The owner would like to solicit market information from the manager so that she can make proper capacity investment to meet the service standard. However, the manager, with his own agenda, may not truthfully share market information with the owner. Second, because of demand uncertainty, the owner cannot observe and has no means of directly verifying the manager's effort level. While the owner would like the manager to exert the optimal marketing effort to maximize the owner's net benefit, the manager has a different interest because for an effort level α he incurs a disutility
which is increasing and convex in α. Thus, the owner has to design proper incentive contracts to induce the manager to reveal true market demand information and exert the desired level of marketing effort. And the compensation contract should be based on observable variable such as the number of requests processed.
Let N be the number of requests, which is a random variable. Following general principal-agent adverse selection model, see [5, 6, 7, and 11] , among others, we also assume risk neutral principal and agent. Let s(N) be the compensation to the manager and M be the manager's net utility from an outside alternative. Thus, the manager will choose an optimal effort level to maximize his net utility given by compensation minus disutility of effort E N [s(N)] -V(α) and he will accept the contract s(N) only when his expected net utility is no less than M.
Next, we first study the full-information case in which the owner can observe the expected base demand θ and the manager's effort level α . We then analyze the information asymmetric case in which θ is the manager's private information and the owner cannot verify the manager's effort level α .
Full-information case
Suppose for now the owner can perfectly observe the expected base demand θ and the manager's effort level α . Hence the owner will determine the optimal capacity μ, manager's effort α , and compensation to the manager s(N) to maximize her net benefit given by revenue minus costs of capacity and payment to the manager, subject to the service standard constraint and the manager's individual rationality constraint. Suppose the realized expected base demand is θ i (i = l, h), then the owner's problem is characterized in equation (1):
(IR) Since the owner can observe the realized expected base demand and verify exactly the manager's effort level, she will not offer the manager more than what is required to make him do the job. Thus, the (IR) constraint will be binding. We know that for the M/M/1 queue in steady state the expected time in the system is given by W i = 1/(μ i -λ i ). Because capacity is costly, the owner will also only invest in the minimum capacity required to satisfy the service standard. Thus, the service standard constraint will be binding as well. Taking the two binding constraints back into equation (1), the owner will determine the optimal effort level to maximize equation (2):
Since equation (2) is concave in effort, solving the first-order condition (FOC), we have the optimal effort α i = (r -c)k, which is independent of the market condition θ i . The optimal capacity level, given by θ i + (r -c)k 2 + 1/W 0 , however, depends on the market condition. The owner will offer to compensate the manager a fixed amount M + ½(r -c) 2 k 2 if the manager exerts the optimal effort level (r -c)k, and she can enforce this contract by penalizing the manager if he does not exert the desired effort level. The manager will accept the offer. We assume that parameters satisfy the condition
such that the owner can make a profit even without the manager's marketing input in the low demand market.
The result of the full-information case is also called the first-best result, which is often used as a benchmark for the case with asymmetric information. Next, we consider the case in which the manager privately observes the market condition θ and his own effort level.
Information asymmetric case
Suppose the owner cannot observe and has no means of directly verifying the manager's effort level, which is known only to the manager. In addition, only the manager can observe the realized expected base demand whereas the owner only knows its distribution. But both parties can observe the realized demand. For the owner, a common solution for the adverse selection problem is to offer a menu of contracts to the manager; each contract is designed for an expected base demand θ i . By observing the contract selected by the manager, the owner is able to infer the true market information and invest in an appropriate capacity level.
The linear contract
We first consider a linear contract s(N) = f + bN with a fixed payment plus a commission term. Note that the fixed payment term can be negative, which indicates a charge for the manager. The decision timeline is as follows: First, the owner announces a set of contracts and capacity levels; each contract and capacity pair (s i (N), μ i ) corresponds to an expected base demand (θ i ). Second, the manager observes the realized expected base demand and reports to the owner (or selects a contract offer). Note that the manager may or may not report truthfully to the owner. Third, the owner, based on the manager's report (or observing the contract selected by the manager), invests in capacity up to the pre-announced level that matches with the selected contract. Forth, the manager invests in marketing effort. Lastly, the final demand is realized and both parties observe the realized demand N. The owner compensates the manager according to the selected contract. Since N is a random variable, the owner cannot infer the value of α even after learning the expected base demand θ and observing the realized value of N. The challenge for the owner is to design a menu of contracts so as to solicit true market information and induce the desired level of marketing effort from the manager and thereby maximize her net benefit.
Following the revelation principle [9] , we only need to search for the optimal menu of contracts from the class of truth-telling contracts. Under such contracts, it is in the manager's interest to truthfully reveal the expected base demand information to the owner. The owner therefore needs to solve equation (3) for the optimal contracts, efforts, and capacities, subject to a series of constraints:
First, the contract s i (N) (i = l, h) has to satisfy the manager's individual rationality constraint in order for the manager to accept the contract:
(IR) Second, because the owner cannot observe and verify the manager's effort level, the manager will choose the effort level that maximizes his own net utility. This gives the manager's incentive compatibility constraint:
(IC)
The above (IR) and (IC) constraints are for the case in which the manager reports truthfully of the realized market condition to the owner. In order for the manager to report truthfully, the optimal contracts also need to satisfy the following two incentive compatibility constraints:
, (IC-HL) where i α refers to the optimal effort level when the manager observes θ i and report θ j (i, j = l, h and i ≠ j). These two constraints ensure that it is in the manager's interest to report truthfully to the owner about the realized market condition.
In addition to the above individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints, the owner also needs to choose the optimal capacity to satisfy the service standard constraints:
Next, we simplify the constraints to solve the owner's problem. Because the manager's net utility function is concave in effort, we can replace the (IC) constraint with the FOC of the manager, which gives the optimal effort level
when the manager reports truthfully. Similarly,
We then can simplify the (IR), (IC-LH) and (IC-HL) constraints:
Further comparison of these constraints shows that from the binding (IC-HL) constraint. Again, the service standard constraints will be binding since capacity is costly.
The owner's problem can now be reduced to solving:
subject to:
. We observe that the commission rate in the highdemand market (b h ) is no less than that in the lowdemand market (b l ), and the manager's net utility in the high-demand market is greater than what he can get from the outside alternative M. . Comparing the contract terms for different market conditions, we see that the owner offers a higher fixed payment (or a lower fixed charge if f i < 0) and a lower commission rate when the realized expected base demand is low. The proposed contracts in Proposition 1 ensure that the manager will accept the contracts and truthfully reveal the realized market condition to the owner. When the expected base demand is θ h , the contract s h (N) can in fact induce the same level of optimal effort as in the full-information case, and the owner will accordingly invest in the same level of capacity. However, because of information asymmetry the owner has to compensate the manager more than that in the full-information case. Thus, the owner realizes less profit when the expected base demand is θ h .
Proposition 1: Following the decision timeline outlined above, this combined adverse selection and moral hazard problem has a unique solution of the optimal linear contract, effort level, and capacity, which maximizes the owner's net profit and induces truthful market information from the manager: (i) the optimal menu of contracts is given by
On the other hand, when expected base demand is θ l , the optimal contract induces less effort than in the full-information case. Accordingly, the owner invests less in capacity, compensates less to the manager, and in the end realizes less profit.
To summarize, with the proposed linear contracts in Proposition 1 the owner is able to solicit true market information from the manager, but this comes at a cost because of information asymmetry. Comparing with the full-information case, the owner will realize less expected profit, even though the expected compensation to the manager is lower. The manager, on the other hand, realizes a higher expected net benefit.
An alternative contract
We now consider an alternative contract approach which induces true market information and the firstbest effort level from the manager. Suppose the owner delegates the capacity investment decision to the manager and offers a uniform per-unit rate to the manager. In return, she charges the manager for using capacity. Again, the owner offers a menu of contracts; each contract includes a uniform per-unit payment to the manager (p), a capacity level (μ i ) with a fixed charge (F i ) for using the capacity, and a penalty term (T i ) if the service standard W i ≤ W 0 is not met. The decision timeline is as follows: First, the owner announces a set of contracts composed of per-unit rate, capacity, capacity charge, and service standard penalty term. Each contract {p, μ i , F i , T i } corresponds to an expected base demand (θ i ). In the second stage, the manager observes the realized market condition and asks the owner for a specific capacity level, i.e., the manager selects a contract. Here, the manager is subjected to the service standard constraint directly, and he is penalized if the service standard is not met. Third, the owner delivers the capacity level selected by the manager. Forth, given the capacity provided by the owner, the manager then invests in marketing effort. Fifth, the final demand is realized. The manager is compensated at the given unit rate, and he also pays the owner the pre-specified fixed amount for using capacity. This is equivalent to delegate all the decision rights to the manager, i.e., putting the manager in the owner's shoes, and the owner then can subtract a fee to extract all surpluses.
Suppose that the owner sets a high enough penalty term such that the manager will always choose to satisfy the service standard. Then the manager's problem is to determine the optimal effort level to maximize his net utility given by
, subject to his participation (IR) constraint and the service standard constraint. The owner's problem is to determine the per-unit payment rate, capacity, capacity charge, and the penalty term to solicit true market information and induce the first-best effort level from the manager. Her objective function is given by
Clearly, the manager prefers the optimal effort level
to maximize his net utility. Thus, the owner can set p = r -c to induce the first-best effort level, and she can then extract all surpluses by setting
while ensuring that the manager will participate. Given that the manager reports truthfully and exerts the optimal effort level
, the owner will invest the minimal capacity level μ i = λ i + 1/W 0 required to satisfy the service standard. The owner's objective function can be simplified to F i -c/W 0 .
We next check if this proposed contract {p, μ i , F i, T i } can induce the manager to truthfully reveal market information and invest in the first-best effort level. First, suppose the expected base demand is θ l . Even at a higher capacity level the manager still invests in the optimal effort level
since effort is costly. Because the capacity charge term satisfies F h > F l , the manager will truthfully reveal his private information about market demand θ l and select the contract {p, μ l , F l , T l }. In this case, the service standard can be met even with the penalty term T l = 0.
However, if the realized expected base demand is θ h , the manager would prefer the contract {p, μ l , F l , 0} over {p, μ h , F h , 0} since the charge for capacity is lower. In that case, the manager would still prefer to invest in the same effort level, and the center cannot meet the service standard since the capacity level is too low. One quick fix is to include a high penalty term in the contract. To prevent the manager from choosing μ l when he observes θ h , the owner can set a high enough penalty term T l , which leads to a negative net utility for the manager if he does not comply with the service standard. This, however, still does not solve the problem because the manager can invest less in marketing effort so that the center meets the service constraint and by doing so he still can realize more net utility. Thus, as in the linear contract case, the owner has to compensate the manager more in the high demand case (by adjusting the capacity charge) to induce him to truthfully share market information and exert the first-best effort level.
Proposition 2:
The following contracts with a uniform unit rate plus a capacity charge and service standard penalty term will solicit true market information and induce the first-best effort levels from the manager: The owner offers a uniform per-unit rate p = r -c to the manager and in return charges the manager Given the contract proposed in Proposition 2, the manager finds it is in his best interest to truthfully report market condition and exerts the first-best effort level. Similar to the linear contract case described in section 4.1, when there is information asymmetry the manager is able to reserve an information rent for the high demand case with this alternative contract specified in Proposition 2. The two contract forms both have a per-unit payment and a fix term, but the linear contract in section 4.1 offers different per-unit rates and the manager is not explicitly subjected to the service standard constraint whereas the owner makes capacity decision. In addition, while both contracts can induce the manager to reveal the true market condition, the alternative contract can induce the first-best effort levels in both markets whereas the linear contract only induces the first-best effort in the high demand market.
Contract analysis and numerical example
In this section, we analyze the results under the two proposed contracts and compare them with the first-best outcome.
While both contracts can solicit true market information from the managers, only the alternative contract can induce the first-best effort levels from the manager under both market conditions. However, when the manager possesses private information on market demand and his effort level, even with the alternative contract the owner realizes less profit than that in the full-information case since she has to compensate the manager more in the high demand market to induce true market information.
When the expected base demand is low, the linear contract offers a lower per-unit rate than the alternative contract, and therefore the manager invests less in marketing effort than that in the alternative contract or full-information case. And the fixed payment f l in the linear contract can be positive or negative depending on parameter values. Since paying the manager the fixed payment f l is equivalent to charging the manager -f l , we can compare the fixed charge -f l with F l . It is straightforward to show that F l > -f l when b l > 0. The expected profits thus have the following relationship:
, where the superscript represents full information (F), alternative contract (A), and linear contract (L).
When the expected base demand is high, both contracts offer the same per-unit rate and can induce the first-best effort level from the manager. Comparing the fixed charge, we find that F h > -f h when q < 1/3. Thus the expected profits have the following relationship:
when q > 1/3. That is, which contract generates higher expected profits depends on the probability distribution of market demand.
While the owner realizes less expected profit when the manager possesses private information on market demand and his effort level, the owner can improve her profit by selecting which contract to offer based on the demand distribution. Through profit comparison we find that when the probability of having a low demand market is higher than that of a high demand market (i.e., q < ½), the owner can realize a higher expected profit level by offering the alternative contract. This is mostly because the alternative contract achieves the same profit level as in the full-information case when the expected base demand is low. However, when the probability of having a high demand market is greater than ½, the owner is better off to offer the linear contract. This is because the linear contract leads to a higher profit level in the high demand market and this profit improvement can offset the profit shortage in the low demand market, especially as the probability of having a low demand market is relatively low.
We next illustrate the results in a simple numerical example. Consider a service center such as a computerized medical imaging center which is characterized with the following parameter values: r = $80, c = $30, W 0 = 0.1, M = $100, k = 0.7, θ l = 30, θ h = 45, and q, the probability of having a high demand market, varies from 0.05 to 0.65. We compute the expected profits when offering the linear contract, the alternative contract, and a pooling contract, and compare them with the profit in the full-information case. Here, the pooling contract refers to a uniform linear contract s(N) = f + bN, i.e., the owner offers the same contract to the manager regardless of market demand. Clearly, this pooling contract does not solicit market information from the manager. Figure 1 shows the percentage of full-information profit that can be achieved by offering the linear, alternative, and pooling contracts. We see that because both the linear and alternative contracts can solicit true market information from the manager, they outperform the pooling contract. In this example, when q = 0.05 (highly likely to have a low demand market) the investor can achieve 17.7% more profit by soliciting market information from the manager with the alternative contract than the pooling contract. When q = 0.65 (more likely to have a high demand market), the investor can achieve 11.9% more profit by offering the linear contract rather than the pooling contract. That is the manager's private information regarding market demand is valuable for the owner. In particular, the linear contract outperforms the alternative contract when there is a higher chance of having a high demand market, i.e., q > ½. In addition, the profit gap between the full-information case and the alternative or pooling contract is increasing in q. However, for certain higher probability values (q) the profit gap is actually decreasing under the linear contract. That is the value of optimal contract choice is increasing as the center's profitability is improved with the linear contract when the probability of having a high demand market is relatively high.
Conclusions
We study the combined moral hazard and adverse selection issue in service environment. In our model, the agent (manager) possesses private information about market demand and his own effort level, and this information is valuable for the principal (firm) since the firm is responsible for capacity investment and has to meet an industry-wide service standard. To solicit market information from the manager, the firm needs to design a menu of incentive contracts. We present two contracting approaches, both are simple to implement in practice. The first approach is to offer a menu of linear contracts with a fixed payment plus a commission term. The manager is responsible for reporting the realized market condition by selecting a contract from the menu. The firm is responsible for capacity selection and meeting the service standard, based on the manager's report of market information. The second approach involves a payment to the manager at a fixed per-unit rate regardless of the market condition, and different charges for the manager for using different levels of capacity. The manager is explicitly responsible for capacity selection and meeting the service standard. The firm can solicit true market information by manipulating the charge for capacity. We show that the second approach not only can solicit true market information from the manager, but also induce the first-best effort level.
We are able to derive the closed-form solutions in both cases and compare them with the first-best outcome. We show that because of information asymmetry, the manager is able to reserve an information rent under both contracts. Thus, the firm's profit level is lower than that in the full-information case. We also find that the firm can improve its profit by selecting which contract to offer based on the demand distribution.
Our work extends existing literature on contract design to a new setting and contributes to current research on service resource management. By integrating resource investment and incentive contract design, firms are able to balance capacity, delay, and agency costs all together and achieve the optimal rather than suboptimal outcome when capacity and compensation decision are made separately. Our study applies to many modern IT service systems, manufacturing, and healthcare facilities and provides guidelines for firms dealing with service environment when the managers have an information advantage.
